A Glimpse of the Indepedence Movement in Indonesia

The Failures of the Bourgeois Party

It wasn't the quality of the leadership itself that caused the Indonesian bourgeois parties to "break in the middle". The advocates, such as Dr A. Rivai and Dr Tjipto, would undoubtedly have played a very different role in the Indonesian independence movement if there had been large indigenous capital. Gradually, of course, they would have arrived at a bourgeois national programme which, through proper organisation and tactics, could be partially or completely realised.

Because there is no major native capital, their national programme and organisation as a bourgeois party cannot survive. They were brought up by a Westernised bourgeois education and were thus not uprooted from the Indonesian masses and had no compulsion to search for the reason in pursuing a proletarian national programme. The bourgeois party that was founded slowly, completely disappeared, "living unwillingly" or only its name remained.

a. Budi Utomo

Budi Utomo - founded in 1908 - is the laziest of all bourgeois parties in Indonesia. Like a lazy animal, it languishes in pride because of its longevity. Because it has no radical bourgeois tactics and does not dare to approach and mobilise the people, from then until now, Budi Utomo's members have spent their time invoking the spirits of the long-dead. The ancient Borobudur, the decaying wayang and gamelan, all the products of "slavery culture" are added to and heralded by them day and night. In the " community" the political shamans often had Hayam Wuruk - the Hindu or half-Hindu king - with his powerful army marching in front of them. Beyond the supernatural, at best only harmless matters were discussed. At the Budi Utomo Congress, Javanese culture and art were repeatedly (and tediously) discussed. The important question of the life of the people in Java - not to mention the whole of Indonesia - was never touched upon, let alone discussed. There has never, perhaps, been an action to improve the fate of ^[11]"Pak Kromo" who does not live in the Golden Age of Majapahit, but in an oppressive capitalistic world. The longevity of Budi Utomo was largely due to the " charms" of its leader, the results of his "flirtation" with the government and the weaknesses of his comrades-in-arms. An empty spirit like Budi Utomo was acceptable to a government like the Netherlands.

Moreover, Budi Utomo did not foster the ideals of "Indonesian nationality". The fantasy of "Jawa-Raya", i.e. the shadow of Hindu or half-Hindu colonisation of the true Indonesian nation, directly or indirectly, led to the desire for Sumatra Raya, Pasundan Raya or Ambon Raya and others.

Budi Utomo's reintroduction of the decrepit and long-forgotten Hindu-Javanese weapons was not tactical and far removed from the general nationalist stance. It aroused the suspicion of other groups who aspired for solidarity and co-operation between the peoples of Indonesia (not between colonisers and each other). In this way, Budi Utomo created regional movements which, if necessary (i.e. Budi Utomo was strong), could easily be used by Dutch imperialism. Under these circumstances, the "noble" desires of one can be pitted against the other, and the result is devastating: Indonesia remains a slave country.

b. National Indische Party

With such a feeble and hesitant mind the N.I.P. founded in 1912 could not "sniff" Indonesian nationality. The bobbing saplings - the Dutch ^[12]Indies - stood with one foot on the side of the abyss of imperialism and the other on the side of the abyss of Indonesian nationality. The former has no national ideals, namely the Indonesian bourgeoisie; the latter is divided. For this reason, a constructive and consequential national programme could not be realised. Douwes Dekker's "Indonesianism" was the ideal of the Indo-Dutch who were no less imperialist than the Dutch, they felt sidelined by the latter and that was the mood he developed. They asked for "equality" with the Dutch and sometimes whispered the word of independence. Their real intention is to share power, one person half between the two of them. Because the Dutch often takes too much for himself, the indies threaten to "co-operate with the ^[13]Inlander". We cannot put a more accurate stamp on the Dutch Indo nationality. They are no different in character from the Hindus and Muslims of the old days of old.

When the witty ^[14]Van Limburg Stirum "liberal servant of big capital" gave Teeuwen and Co. lucrative jobs at the time, the N.I.P. programme achieved its goals without shedding blood.

Douwes Dekker marched on; to achieve this, he considered it necessary to utilise native power. With his vague talk of rights and independence, Dr Tjipto, Soewardi and Co. were drawn into the N.I.P. This incident gave soul to a sapling of Indonesian nationalism unknown in the rest of the Indonesian movement.

A modern ideal of national unity that was far healthier and larger than the Great Javanese fantasy (the Hindu colonial ideal and the castes) could be said to have been born in the whole of the Indonesian Archipelago. However, after Dr Tjipto, Soewardi and Co. took their seats in the N.I.P., people really took notice; there could be seen a conflict between the members of the association. On one side stood the imperialistically educated, arrogant and suspicious Indo-Bourgeoisie, on the other side stood the economically and politically squashed, squeezed and trampled native. Neither social nor ideological assimilation had been achieved. One N.I.P. member was very happy to have a 50-50 division of labour with the much-hated imperialists.

Teeuwen's appointment as a member of the People's Council, and later as a high-ranking official, was indeed a perfect cure for the N.I.P.'s political ills.

Let alone revolutionary action, a strike is far from what the Indo-members of the N.I.P. want. Moreover, the revolution demands close contact and true assimilation with the Indonesian nation, not only with the clean gentry, but also with Pak Kromo. And above all, the sharing of political power with the largest number of Inlanders.

And a strike that might turn into a revolution, no matter how small, will certainly always be in conflict with the interests and ideologies of the landlords and Dutch-Indo officials.

As long as the words "rights and freedom" remain in the background, the Dutch-Indo can join hands with the Javanese aristocracy. However, the class antagonism which in recent years has been evident in strikes has brought out the nationalist-imperialist (nationalist by name and imperialist by deed) nature of the "national" Indische Party.

What the Indo members of the N.I.P desired was now opened up by the I.E.V.: land rights and fascism. Native N.I.P. members are generally more radical than Dutch Indo.

However, they are confined to the "nationality of Douwes Dekker" (an exhilarating theory of "Eastern blood and Eastern affections") whose economic section is closed with chaotic wardism. If the N.I.P. had had a leader who could have linked Indonesian nationalism with the proletarian programme and drawn the workers into the party, the N.I.P., despite the abandonment of the fascistic Dutch-Indo, could have continued to exist and perhaps been stronger than it was.

But again, because there is no modern native bourgeoisie, such a healthy and revolutionary spirit as Dr Tjipto has no place in the bourgeois revolutionary movement. Instead, rather than approaching the masses over and over again, they prefer to pass the time with the unworthy labour of summoning the spirits of the great (Hindu and Islamic) saints.

A true " illusionary" nationalist.

c. Sarekat Islam (S.I)

Sarekat Islam came to the front in 1913 with a thunderous voice. It was the mouthpiece of the semi-feudal Eastern masses who had suffered centuries of oppression. However, it was not an organised mass action, but a manifestation of the dissatisfied feelings of the masses under the leadership of small merchants.

By involving religion, he gathered the Kromo into a very petty organisation. And in the beginning it was directed against the Chinese merchants.

In the economic struggle between the indigenous merchants and the Chinese, the weaknesses of the former are clearly visible. The treachery of the S.I. leaders caused and contributed to the economic defeat. With the end of the movement, the activities of the small merchants in the S.I. ceased. If we want to call the mixed ideology of Islam, national reformism and demagogy of the S.I. leaders "political", then we now see that the S.I. has reached the "political" level. At this political level, thanks to the influence of the revolutionaries in Semarang, it was possible for them to organise "wild" economic strikes.

The disgruntled masses united in the S.I. could not form the basis of organised mass action. For this reason, the S.I. leaders do not have the slightest knowledge of class antagonism, revolutionary tactics, and leadership. In addition, a constructive and consistent revolutionary programme, organisational skills and administrative honesty were missing. The S.I. movement, whose beginnings were so great and attracted so much public attention - that it was often likened to the Charterism movement - seemed to have won only because of favourable circumstances.

Due to the indecisiveness and weakness of the S.I. action, the disillusioned and the more radicalised bourgeois Islamists took the wrong path. All the long-buried feudal tools of mysticism, amulets and incantations were taken up by them and used against imperialism, and of course they were decimated.

Even if the Afd. B. of the S.I. manages to crawl underground a little longer and at the right time integrates itself into the struggle, it will get nothing but mutiny and religious riots like those that have repeatedly occurred in Indonesia.

The S.I. organisation died when the revolutionaries of Semarang in 1921 discarded party discipline (Haji A. Salim's trade mark). What followed was nothing less than a schism of S.I. members, the most active of whom left to join the S.R. and the P.K.I. The Muhammadiyah faction in all honesty accepted subsidies from the hands of the "infidel" government for Islamic schools. The two famous Hajjis - Agus and Tjokro - could no longer burst the Islamic soap bubble with their secrets of old and new-minded sharia.

What Now?

In the long and arduous struggle of the past few years, the P.K.I. and S.R. have succeeded in bringing together the workers and revolutionaries of the B.U., N.I.P., and S.I. under its banner. No other party has taken such a toll as the P.K.I. and S.R. Thousands of members have been arrested, dozens have been banished, beaten or killed. Even so, its flag is still recognised on every island, hill, mountain, town and village (in Indonesia). It is used as a symbol of the long-desired independence.

The P.K.I. and the S.R. have shown their strength and prowess in several regional actions for modest objectives. However, to organise a nationwide general action (let alone in the international field), they really have not been able to do so. This, in the name of the freedom of 55 million human beings, cannot be ignored. To do so would be to fall into the same error that the bourgeois parties (especially the party of Tjokro & Co.) are constantly making. When the Prohibition of Assembly appeared at the end of last year, we showed no displeasure. Now, more than eight months later, nothing has happened. Where are the hundreds of thousands or millions of people in Java, Sumatra and Sulawesi who stand directly under our leadership or are subject to our influence? Where have the loyal revolutionaries gathered in the V.S.T.P., S.P.P.L., S.B.G., S.B.B. and others, as well as the several million unorganised people who sympathise with us, gone in those eight months? Shall we immediately mobilise and attract the people to take revenge for the birth of the Prohibition of Assembly, the period of arrest and banishment and the deaths of brothers Soegono, Misbach and others with a mass action that is commensurate, but carried out joyfully.

No, we have not at all fended off the attacks of our opponents, and so there is now inevitable discord in the revolutionary ranks, with members of anarchists going their own way and taking away their comrades.

In addition to our good, much loved chapters, such as West Sumatra, Medan, Semarang, Surabaya, suffer from disastrous decisions and organisational weaknesses that cannot be helped.

If we had responded to the December Ultimatum of the Dutch imperialists with perfect communistic action, our defeat would not have been what it is now. As rotten as the material sacrifices (arrests, banishments, killings) were, they would not have been greater than they are now, but the political and moral victory would have been permanent. And who can say what we would have gained under the best of circumstances?.

The prohibition of assembly was not answered in communist fashion, and during those eight months we were forced to work underground. During that time, we lost our best comrades for nothing, in addition, there were many happy moments, especially psychologically, which are hard to come back from.

This is not the place to discuss it further, nor is it the place to examine to whom the blame should be laid: on the chapters, on the leadership or on something else?

Let us leave this to "history" and to the organisation that will later investigate why we let such a good opportunity pass us by. Nor is it the place to announce the present strength of our organisation, and our influence on the masses in this difficult situation; likewise, our intentions and tactics in the future, also because we are now forced to work underground. So, in the interests of the movement, a lot has to be kept secret, which we will tell in the future to our comrades-in-arms and to those who support us (Please take note! We mean mass action and not putch!).

Please take Chapter IX to heart once again. We should immediately organise and lead a strike with suitable demands and slogans to oppose and answer the ban on assembly.

If from such actions a revolution breaks out, we must accept it. To think and act otherwise is not communistic!

"Illegal" work is full of dangers. We should and must also elaborate on that here. Legal work and only legal work produces organisations, orators, organizers, and leaders. Legal magazines, parties and speeches can educate our scattered nation in a very useful way to become politically active and keep alive that important common revolutionary thought. On the other hand, in a transforming country like Indonesia, illegal work can easily degenerate into anarchism, riots or the belief in harmful talismans. All the organisational and ideological gains we have made over the years are lost due to "an untimely" illegality. It is easy for provocations from opponents to bring down our inexperienced leaders and destroy the organisation altogether.

Legal organisations "must be willing" to create an illegal organisation at the time of revolution. Secret contacts, secret meetings, secret printing, and secret printing headquarters. If the ban on assembly and organisation is suddenly lifted, the organisation must continue to work in an orderly manner. The illegal organisation must be in constant contact with the masses and must never alienate itself from them. It must always know the feelings and wishes of the masses. Therefore, it must have sufficient bodies and people working for the "bona fide" party bodies, i.e. those associations still authorised by the government. If it is not in touch with the masses and the reality of the situation, it is like a submarine without a kaleidoscope.

Whether working legally or illegally, we must never forget our revolutionary arsenal, organised mass action. We must break the ban on gathering and convening with our organised mass action, so that "on" deep views and great energy we can continue our march towards total independence.

Are we really working underground? Such a question is repeatedly put to us. It relates to the question of whether we ever had enough energy in the party, which, despite all obstacles, was loyal to organised mass action. Furthermore, has Marxist education been carried out properly and long enough so that our workers have acquired Marxist stability, Leninist flexibility? If this has not happened, then a forced illegal action will create chaos in the entire revolutionary movement in Indonesia. Non-labourists will take hold of the commodity and lead the party into putch or anarchism and it will eventually collapse altogether. This danger will be all the greater because accomplished revolutionary leaders with influence over the masses are being summarily exiled from Indonesia, while the reaction grows more and more fierce.

We are thus faced with a revolutionary crisis that is not easily understood by foreigners.

Now the need is not for courage alone but, moreover, "revolutionary knowledge and the ability to take revolutionary stances".

Dutch imperialism intends to completely destroy the revolutionary organisation: delenda est Chartago (Chartago must be destroyed). Answer now or later (forever and ever) all the attempts of the enemy to destroy us; by means of organised mass action, we are surely on our way to victory!

De Indonesische Studieclub

Until now I have not had the opportunity to find out what the ^[15]Indonesische Studieclub really wants and what tools it intends to use to realise its aims. The description "monthly magazine of the studieclub" means nothing to me.

It is too vague, too elastic and too insufficient. It should therefore not be considered as a national "basis" for practical struggle. ^[16]Suluh Indonesia announced many different views. However, we cannot say whether this was done deliberately or as a trick because, at times, the studieclub could tell us, according to Indonesian intellectual custom, that "in the darkness there is light".

From Mr Singgih's speech as published in Suluh Indonesia and other magazines we can " sense" a little (no more than that!) that Mr Singgih and his colleagues have intentions that resemble non-cooperation. It's not definite yet! My general impression is that Mr Singgih seems to be acting more as a backbench advocate against the lurking members of the government than as an ambassador of a blazing new ideal for millions of bonded slaves. An understandable policy, but one that, in my view, does no small amount of harm. From experience, I think we know that our humble people do not like to "throw stones and hide hands", do not like obscure notions and spend time replying to empty words. Our people want clear and precise words. Otherwise, they will remain uncertain and guessing and will not be able to be persuaded to take action.

But it remains a big question as to whether non-cooperation alone - even if it were perfectly viable in both politics and economics - could bring results for Indonesia as a whole. On the subject of economics and boycotts, we refer the reader to the descriptions mentioned below. This part of economics and boycotts in Indonesia (especially in Java) demands attention and, if we are not mistaken, has never once been discussed in the actual Studieclub, which is a sign of the weakness of the Studieclub's non-cooperation.

A boycott without the economic part is a far-fetched and inadequate endeavour. Nevertheless, let us concede. That political non-cooperation alone can bring political victory, let it remain as a mere proposition; with economic boycott, we can achieve political goals.

Now the most important question remains, which part of the Indonesian populace should be mobilised by the Studieclub to break off "co-operation" with Dutch imperialism.

Here is the kicker! We are not dealing with a country where the government is totally or partially steered by representatives of the people, as in the Philippines, Egypt and now India. So, we do not have a "mobile" government (subject to being "voted down" and "voted up"), but a rusty, dead colonial bureaucracy. To cause a meaningful uproar in politics, we must fight and tear the bureaucracy down from its very foundations. So, we must approach the officials, such as regents, wedana, demang, prosecutors and school teachers, and ask them to lay down their positions.

We a priori believe that it is not possible at all, and in the meantime let's not give a posteriori evidence. It is obvious that the regents are conservative and must be on all fours, licking their Dutch arse and fearing the Europeans more than they should. They are dependent on their brothers and are usually heavily in debt; therefore, they will depend on their salaries as much as possible. They were "too fond" of ruling and felt too superior, unfit to accompany movements and conspire with the people who wanted to organise riots. Wedana and prosecutors are no less, and even more, desperate for high rank; hence, they are more "hacks" and " bootlickers" than the higher Indonesian officials.

We believe that Mr Singgih and his friends will do the infinitely difficult work of breaking the entrenched Dutch bureaucracy and, in turn, gaining national independence or major political concessions.

All that's left is for the Studieclub to non-cooperate with the town meetings. We don't think that was wrong at all! We would've have just rather have Dr Soetomo and his friends sit in on the Surabaya town meeting, the only imperialist body that Indonesians can enter by direct (albeit very limited) election and express themselves freely. There, Dr Soetomo and his friends, with their extensive knowledge of the tricks of the other side, would have been able to "trouble" the position of the town meeting with their unceasing resistance and criticism of the authorities.

Having considered all of the above, we really regret the politics and actions of the Studieclub to date. If the Studieclub does not "take up all or part of our workers' programme" (we say this not because we wish to demean or offend the Studieclub intelligentsia), it will undoubtedly accept the fate of the B.U. and N.I.P. Since the social relationship between Western imperialism and the Indonesian nation of a strong native bourgeoisie "does not exist", creating a political modus vivendi is a work yet to be begun. The Studieclub of tomorrow or the day after will undoubtedly be faced with the same dilemma that the bourgeois parties have already faced, i.e:

co-operation with the Dutch Government, and thus following the politics of Dutch imperialism; or

cooperation with the people, seizing the widest possible independence, and thus becoming a mass workers' party and thinking in a workers' way. "The politics of the centre, of liberalism, for the Studieclub means 'mass politics'."

It is the politics of resistance such as No.2 that we recommend to Dr Soetomo, Mr Singgih and their friends when they are appointed or elected by the government to the People's Council.

Thus, the Studieclub intelligentsia must abandon the mindset of struggle, aspiring to bourgeois revolution or bourgeois government, but become workers, that is, adopt the dialectical-materialistic workers' mindset and fight for the interests of the workers.